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INTRODUCTION 
 
Contingent fee financing of litigation is a crucial aspect of the United States’ 
system of adjudication. Under current Belgian law, however, the contingent 
fee system is explicitly forbidden. In the present article, the authors would like 
to deepen the knowledge of that system, by providing an adequate definition, a 
brief overview of its history and a more general perspective on how the system 
works in the United States, while focusing on its possible merits. Having 
considered the merits of the system as well as its concrete application in the 
United States, the authors will try to shed some light upon the degree of 
compatibility of the contingent fee system with the Belgian legal context and, 
on a more profound level, with the general principles that underlie Belgian 
law. The potential flaws of the system will be discussed in that section as well, 
given that those perceived disadvantages can be regarded as reflecting the 
historical bases of the Belgian ban. Thereafter, the authors will conclude this 
article with a personal point of view with regard to the desirability of the 
implementation of this controversial litigation financing system. By means of 
writing this article, the authors want to flutter the dovecotes, in order to 
revitalize the academic interest in this matter, because ‘the matter of fees’ is 
important, as the quote by Abraham Lincoln illustrates: “The matter of fees is 
important, far beyond the mere question of bread and butter involved. 
Properly attended to, fuller justice is done to both lawyer and client.” 
 
 
1. THE CONTINGENT FEE IN GENERAL 
 
1.1. DEFINITION OF THE CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT 
 
The contingent fee contract is often seen as a pro-plaintiff innovation and can 
be defined as the agreement between a plaintiff
1
 and a lawyer, wherein the 
                                                     
1 Representation under the contingent fee system is limited almost entirely to plaintiffs. Contingent 
fee lawyers will therefore almost always be opposed by defense lawyers paid on an hourly basis. 
Consequently, it is very rare that lawyers on both sides of the litigation are representing their 
clients on a contingent fee basis. Cf. C. W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West 
Publishing, 1986, 526, footnote 3. 
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latter offers to represent the plaintiff free of virtually all charges, up until the 
settlement or judgment has been obtained, at which time the lawyer receives a 
stated percentage of the award.
2
 That percentage varies
3
, depending on the type 
of action, the likelihood of a recovery and the anticipated preparation costs and 
labour
4
.  
 
The fee does not need to be measured by a percentage in order to be 
contingent, although this is typical.
5
 However, if it is measured by a 
percentage, it can be a fixed or flat percentage, or a variable percentage
6
, e.g. a 
different contingent fee rate at different stages of a case
7
, or in relation to the 
amount recovered by the client
8
. What is required, is that there is some chance 
the lawyer will not receive the fee for reason that the representation ends with 
an unwanted result for his client.
9
 Consequently, there has to be an element of 
risk involved: notwithstanding its size, the fee will accrue only on the 
happening of a future event of which the occurrence is not readily 
predictable.
10
 If courts have to determine whether a fee is contingent or not
11
, 
they try to identify whether the fee is importantly conditioned on favourable 
future events.
12
 The court might also deem portions of the total fee conditional, 
e.g. when the plaintiff pays a portion in advance which is not conditional, 
while the other portions of the total fee remain conditional (and therefore 
contingent).
13
  
                                                     
2 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 231. 
3 But if one should pick a ‘standard’ percentage, it would be 30 or 33 %, cf. L. BRICKMAN, 
“Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?”, UCLA 
L.Rev.1989, (29) 30; H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (267) 286; D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial 
Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the United States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 
160. 
4 An important article in that respect is L. BRICKMAN, “Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: 
Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?”, UCLA L.Rev. 1989, (29) 30. He criticizes that a lot of 
lawyers work with a standard contingent fee, without taking into account factual differences and 
different risks. In his opinion, this leads to the fact that many contingent fees are invalid as a 
matter of ethics, policy or law, when there is no real contingency or when the contingent fee 
exceeds the legitimate risk premium for the anticipated effort by far. 
5 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 267, footnote 1. 
6 Ibidem, 286. 
7 E.g. 25 % for an early settlement, 33 % for a judgment in first instance and 50 % for a 
confirmation in appeal. 
8 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 125. 
9 C. W. WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 526. 
10 Ibidem. 
11 Which might be relevant, given that there are explicit prohibitions against contingent fee 
agreements in certain matters, cf. infra. 
12 C. W. WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 526, footnote 4. For 
an example, cf. Shanks v. Kilgore, 589 S.W.2d 318, 321-322 (Mo.App. 1979). 
13 C. W. WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 526, footnote 4. For 
an example, cf. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 969-970 (5th Circ.1970). 
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With respect to the method of calculation, the contingent fee differs from the 
hourly fee, whereby the specific amount of the fee is based on the number of 
hours spent on the case, and the flat fee, whereby the specific amount of the 
fee is a fixed amount for performing a specific legal service.
14
 Under the 
hourly fee or flat fee, the lawyer often requires an advance payment and bills 
the client regardless of outcome.
15
  
 
Given that the payment of the contingent fee is contingent, it is said that the 
client of a lawyer applying that calculation method also purchases additional 
services that are not procured if, in contrast, the hourly fee or the flat fee were 
to be taken recourse to, namely a financing service and, according to certain 
authors, a form of insurance.
16
 The lawyer provides financing, because the 
contingent fee will, by its own nature, almost never be collected until the 
matter is closed: the lawyer finances the litigation for the client while a case is 
pending.
17
 The alleged insurance service results from the fact that the lawyer 
only gets paid when the happening of a future event occurs, the payment 
therefore being conditional. As a result, the lawyer is said to insure the client 
for the expenses that are associated with pursuing his claim, both the out-of-
pocket expenses and the value of his or her time.
18
 The lawyer may still obtain 
some fee after the litigation process to cover some of the expenses made, but 
that fee will not cover the opportunity costs of the lawyer’s time.19 The lawyer 
bears the risk of not being paid for the time he invested in the case, which is 
time that he could have devoted more productively by working on another case 
in regard of which he can count on it that some fee will be obtained, either 
hourly or contingent. It is thus stated that the economic risks related to the 
litigation process are shifted from the client to the lawyer.
20
 However, the 
contingent fee agreement should not be regarded to entail an insurance service 
in our opinion, because an insurance agreement requires payment of a 
premium. Consequently, the service cannot be considered as that of a real 
insurance, but rather as an even more valuable service rendered to the client at 
the expense of the attorney in the case of the undesired outcome. 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the United 
States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 160. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 270. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 Ibidem. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the United 
States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 160. 
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1.2. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
It is important to note that the American Bar Association (hereafter: “ABA”) 
has laid down some principles governing contingent fees in the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (hereafter: “Model Rules”)21, which are adopted by the 
District of Columbia and all States except for California
22
. As regards the latter 
State, however, the Model Rules can nevertheless be cited there as evidence of 
the law.
23
  
 
The Model Rules require that the contingent fee is in writing.
24
 If the 
agreement is not in writing, the court will not enforce the contingent fee 
agreement.
25
 However, some courts will give the lawyer a quantum meruit 
recovery in the event he has acted properly in other respects and performed 
competently for the client. Nonetheless, other courts refuse any recovery at 
all.
26
 The agreement should clearly notify the client of which expenses he will 
be liable for, in case he would turn out to be the prevailing party as well as in 
case that, by contrast, would not occur.
27
 The Model Rules have also explicitly 
forbidden a contingent fee agreement in matters concerning domestic 
relations
28
 and in criminal cases
29
. Note that the contingent fee agreement can 
be forbidden by another type of law (e.g. State law) as well.
30
  
 
                                                     
21 Which can be consulted online here:  
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profession
al_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html, last accessed on 
05.03.2013. 
22www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professio
nal_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html, last accessed on 05.03.2013.   
23 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 7. 
24 Rule 1.5(c) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
25 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 116. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Rule 1.5(c) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
28 Contingent fees in domestic relations are ‘rarely’ justified and even flatly forbidden in divorce 
matters upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property 
settlement, cf. Rule 1.5(d)(1) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A possible rationale 
behind that prohibition is that public policy does not encourage divorce and that a contingent fee 
could encourage the attorney to prevent a possible reconciliation of the parties involved, cf. R.D. 
ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, West 
Group, 2002-2003, 121-123. 
29 The rationale usually given in support of this prohibition is that there is no res out of which the 
contingent fee is to be paid and that the law will provide free appointed counsel when the client is 
unable to pay a lawyer. Note that the state cannot hire a prosecutor on a contingent fee basis, 
which would only yield the prosecutor income if he secures a criminal conviction, given that the 
duty of a prosecutor is to do justice, not per se to convict. Cf. R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The 
Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, West Group, 2002-2003, 121. 
30 Rule 1.5(c) jo. 1.5(d) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
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The Model Rules state that the lawyer has no right to impose a contingent fee 
on a client who desires an alternative arrangement and that the lawyer should 
even volunteer those alternative arrangements if they are in the client’s best 
interest.
31
 The contingent fee should accordingly be for the benefit of clients 
who wish to choose that arrangement, not for the benefit of the lawyer.
32
 
However, the ethical rules do not limit the contingent fee arrangement to poor 
litigants. Furthermore, the ABA has advised that, even when liability may be 
clear and the client can afford alternatives, such a situation does not render the 
contingent fee inappropriate or unethical
33
, as long as the lawyer fulfils the 
ethical obligation to offer alternatives and explain their implications, when 
they are in the client’s best interest.34 
 
Contingent fees for legal services are widespread as a general fixture of client-
lawyer contractual relationships in American law, among others in the fields of 
personal injury
35
 and collection cases. By contrast, in most other legal systems, 
lawyers are prohibited from charging a contingent fee to their clients.
36
 A 
similar prohibitive rule existed in the United States as well and does still exist 
in criminal cases and most domestic relation cases
37
, yet the fee has gradually 
gained a modicum of general acceptance
38
. The contingent fee so has become 
one of the defining characteristics of civil litigation in the United States 
nowadays
39
.  
 
1.3. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONTINGENT FEE 
 
KARSTEN suggests that the contingent fee system has been a part of the United 
States of America’s legal system longer than most scholars had thought, and 
that its widespread use is the result of fundamental concerns about the right to 
counsel and access to the courts.
40
 According to KARSTEN, contingent fee 
                                                     
31 Rule 1.5, Comment 3 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
32 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 116. 
33 ABA Formal Opinion 94-389 (Dec. 5, 1994), which can be consulted here: 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/YourABA/201203_94-
389.authcheckdam.pdf, last consulted on 05.03.2013; R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s 
Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, West Group, 2002-2003, 124. 
34 Rule 1.5, Comment 3 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
35 Virtually all plaintiffs pay their lawyers on a contingency basis here. 
36 C. W. WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 526-527. As 
aforementioned, the contingent fee system is prohibited in Belgium as well. 
37 Rule 1.5(d) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; D. MELLINKOFF, Lawyers and the 
System of Justice: Cases and Notes on the Profession of the Law, Saint-Paul, West Publishing Co., 
1976, 296. 
38 C. W. WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 527. 
39 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 267. 
40 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 237-244. 
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contracts were already created and sanctioned mid-nineteenth century
41
 and 
not in the late nineteenth century as many other scholars had suggested before 
his article was published
42
. According to LANDSMAN, moving the date of the 
rise of the contingent fee back at least half a century undercuts much of the 
historical challenges to it. He argues that such assertion would suggest that 
contingency strategies are to be situated within the American legal system 
already at the time it was taking on its identity and that it has been a concern 
from earliest times on that both rich and poor would have guaranteed access to 
the courts.
43
  
 
The history of the contingent fee traces back all the way to the Middle Ages in 
England. Ever since the Middle Ages, the common law doctrine of 
‘champerty’44 and even penal statutes barred men from offering to plead the 
legal claim of a stranger and finance the litigation by settling for a share in the 
recovery
45
. LANDSMAN finds at least a part of the explanation in the fact that 
solicitors seldom occupied positions in Parliament or the High Court bench, 
because those places were reserved for barristers, whose fees were tendered in 
advance and only in rare occasions had contact with clients or responsibility 
for the initiation of litigation. He finds it no surprise that the high-placed 
lawyers frowned upon the practices of those who were lower-placed.
46
 Two 
other possible explanations were provided by LANDSMAN: on the one hand, the 
theme of curtailing access to court which allegedly echoes through English 
legal history (cf. also the ‘loser pays’-rule that was adopted) and, on the other 
hand, the allegation that these contingent fee arrangements were dangerous 
because they could encourage feudal lords to abuse the system in furtherance 
of the pursuit of power and property.
47
 Consequently, contingent fee 
agreements were unavailable in the United Kingdom. 
 
                                                     
41 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 237-244. 
42 L.M. FRIEDMAN, A History of American Law, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1985, 482; E.A. 
PURCELL, Litigation and Inequality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, 150; C. W. 
WOLFRAM, Modern Legal Ethics, Saint Paul, West Publishing, 1986, 527. 
43 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 
1998, (261) 261-262. 
44 Champerty as defined by B.A. GARNER, Black’s Law Dictionary, Saint Paul, West Publishing 
Co., 2009, 262: “An agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by 
which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration for receiving part of any 
judgment proceeds; specif., an agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the 
litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the claim”. This 
word has its etymological roots in French, champs parti, which means ‘split field’. 
45 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 232; S. LANDSMAN, “The History 
of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1998, (261) 262. 
46 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 
1998, (261) 262. 
47 Ibidem, 263. 
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 In colonial America, there was a reception of English common law, including 
the champerty doctrine. However, already early in the nineteenth century, 
more and more states held those contingent fee agreements to be enforceable, 
while other states thought of those agreements as useful and convenient, but 
they regarded themselves bound by common law precedent and principles until 
the state legislature changed the law.
48
 That is a strange and intriguing 
evolution: the practice was suspiciously regarded at first, while, by the 1850s, 
it was increasingly deemed acceptable.
49
 LANDSMAN points to the fact that 
American attitudes towards litigation were quite different from those in 
England.
50
 KARSTEN provides us with other possible answers to the question 
how the evolution was even remotely possible.
51
 First of all, legislation of the 
people’s assemblies enabled greater contractual freedom to lawyers regarding 
fee arrangements with their clients, which substantially narrowed the scope 
(e.g. Virginia) or even banned the rule (e.g. New York) of the champerty 
doctrine in certain states.
52
 Secondly, the state’s Supreme Court allowed 
contingent fee agreements in certain non-code or pre-code states, because they 
were apparently more impressed by utilitarian arguments
53
 than precedent.
54
 
The last reason provided by KARSTEN boils down to a bottom-up argument: 
the American public had been putting those contingent fee agreements to 
increasing numbers of use, even before some of their supreme courts had 
sanctioned them or their state’s legislative body had permitted them. 55 
 
In 1875, the validity of contingent fee arrangements seemed sealed now that 
United States Supreme Court Chief Justice WAITE called one of these 
arrangements a ‘legitimate and honorable professional assistance’.56 However, 
                                                     
48 For a good overview of those developments, including a lot of examples from then leading 
scholars and relevant case law, cf. P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: 
The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 
234-239. 
49 Ibidem, 240. 
50 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 
1998, (261) 263. He states that the American tradition bespeaks both receptivity to litigation and 
facilitation of access, unlike the mother country. Americans also rejected the English reticence 
about the right to counsel in his opinion and the ‘loser pays’ principle. 
51 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 240-248. 
52 Ibidem, 240. 
53 Those utilitarian arguments were, among others, that the lawyer would work harder if he was to 
receive payment only if he was successful, that he would not take up a case without merit (he 
functions as a first judge, like he ought to in Belgium) and that the lawyer would help a poor man 
to sue for his right. As a result of this contingent fee system, a poor litigant could now afford 
skilled legal services. The system was regarded a pro-plaintiff innovation, opening the doors of 
justice. Cf. P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of 
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 242-243. 
54 Ibidem, 242. 
55 Ibidem, 248. 
56 U.S. Supreme Court, October 1875, Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U.S. 1875, 252. The U.S. Supreme 
Court had already indicated it deemed such agreements valid in U.S. Supreme Court, 1874, Trist v. 
Child, 88 U.S. 1874, 441.  
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the contracts were never sanctioned when their purposes were deemed to be 
contrary to good public policy, e.g. in family related matters or in criminal 
cases.
57
 It is however a generally accepted arrangement nowadays in debt, tax 
or promissory note collection, land title or inheritance cases and especially 
personal injury litigation.
58
 
 
1.4. PERCEIVED MERITS OF THE SYSTEM 
 
Before we dive into the merits of the system that are most often pointed to, we 
feel obliged to stress out that we agree with KRITZER’s statement that the most 
available sources of information that should help us understanding the realities 
of contingency fees present a distorted image.
59
 The press only reports on 
events that are news and therefore not ordinary day-to-day events: jury verdicts 
that are reported tend to represent only the extreme outliers. Consequently, the 
average award of the reported cases is allegedly ten times or more the average 
award of all cases.
60
 The findings of KRITZER’s empirical research have been 
kept in mind throughout the discussion of the perceived merits and flaws of the 
contingent fee system, given that he rightly claims that only carefully designed 
and systematic research can provide an accurate picture of the typical 
contingency fee practice and that anecdotes or patterns reflected in news 
reporting should in that regard not be relied on. 
 
1.4.1. Accessibility 
 
Reference has already been made to the fact that the lawyer provides his client 
with additional services when he is being paid on a contingent fee basis, 
namely a financing service and a service equivalent to insurance
61
. Those are 
unquestionably pro-plaintiff services, which are of a considerable value. 
 
As KARSTEN has chosen to place emphasis on, by choosing it as the title for 
one of his articles on contingent fees, the contingent fee contract enables the 
poor to have their day in court
62
. CORBOY has used a likewise metaphor and 
stated that contingent fees are the average person’s key to the courthouse.63 A 
person without the necessary means to hire a lawyer otherwise finds himself 
capable of finding legal assistance, without the risk of not being able to pay the 
                                                     
57 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev. 1998, (231) 249. 
58 Ibidem, 250. 
59 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 268. 
60 Ibidem, 269. 
61 Cf. supra: the nuance made in regard to the alleged ‘insurance’ kind of service the lawyer 
provides in the event he is remunerated on a contingent fee basis. 
62 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L.Rev., 231-260. 
63 As referred to in H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal 
Practice”, DePaul L.Rev.1998, (267) 267. 
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legal costs. Given that legal representation is a privilege and not a right in civil 
procedures, unlike in criminal procedures, contingent fees allow the poor and 
the not-so-poor to obtain that legal representation.
64
 The system gives them the 
chance to pursue the compensation to which they are entitled
65
: given that the 
client owes the lawyer a fee only upon receiving judgment proceedings or a 
settlement outside of court, there is neither insolvency risk, nor a liquidity 
problem when the client receives a monetary compensation. Justice would be 
practically denied to the poorer citizens, if the law prohibited lawyers from 
engaging in contingent fee agreements.
66
 That is clearly an argument from a 
humane perspective
67
 and as a result, a poor man can sue a rich corporation
68
. 
That wish to give ‘every man his day in court’ contrasts with the theme of 
curtailing access to the judicial system that echoes through English legal 
history
69
, since the contingent fee system assures that citizens can pursue their 
claims in and outside of court
70
. 
 
1.4.2. Lawyer – Client Relation 
 
Under the contingent fee system, the lawyer will – more than under an hourly 
fee system in which he gets compensated for the time he invested in the case – 
function as a first judge. Rational lawyers will screen out cases with a low 
probability of recovery.
71
 Others are more sceptical and think a lawyer might 
take up a case of which the outcome is very uncertain or a case in which he 
will have to invest a lot, both out-of-pocket expenses and time. This might
72
 be 
factored in when he negotiates on the percentage he will be entitled to.
73
 If a 
lawyer will in fact, and not just in theory, act as the first judge, the risk of a 
flood of litigation will be lower, since unlawful claims will be screened out by 
the lawyer who is not likely to receive any fee under the contingent fee system 
and therefore functions as a gatekeeper.
74
 This does not entail the client will 
have no access to the courts if he really wants to litigate: he can still try to find 
                                                     
64 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the United 
States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 159. 
65 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev., (267) 268. 
66 G.L. ARCHER, Ethical Obligations of the Lawyer, Cambridge, University Press, 1910, 191. 
67 P. KARSTEN, “Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940”, DePaul L Rev. 1998, (231) 259. 
68 L.M. FRIEDMAN, A History of American Law, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1985, 482. 
69 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 
1998, (261) 263. 
70 Ibidem, 265. 
71 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 270. 
72 A lawyer who works on a contingent fee can be said to in principle internalize the cost of 
additional time, without internalizing extra resulting benefit. Cf. R. COOTER and T. ULEN (eds.), 
Law & Economics (fifth edition), Reading, Addison-Wesley, 2008, 432. 
73 Ibidem. 
74 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 120. 
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a lawyer that will take up his case on a (high) contingent fee or on an hourly or 
flat fee. 
 
The contingent fee provides a strong inducement for lawyers to provide high-
quality service, because it creates a bond between the lawyer’s self-interest and 
the client’s wellbeing, given that performance is rewarded and failure is 
punished.
75
 It is attractive to clients who cannot evaluate the quality of 
lawyers’ efforts easily and for whom the burden of monitoring what level of 
expenditure is necessary would be overwhelming: they just pay a premium 
now for quality service whenever they are the prevailing party.
76
 On the other 
hand, the contingent fee can raise potential conflicts of interest between the 
lawyer and the client, because one of them might want to settle, while the other 
wants to press on.
77
 The lawyer might want to settle quickly so that he assures 
income before much work has been done, while this may not be in the best 
interest of the client.
78
 The Model Rules have provided us with some specific 
provisions dealing with those conflicts of interest and they forbid lawyers from 
acquiring a proprietary interest, except for a reasonable contingent fee in a 
civil case.
79
 In addition, a lawyer cannot require a client to give up his right to 
settle litigation
80
 or to fire his lawyer
81
. 
 
Contingent fee arrangements also minimize the need for courts to evaluate the 
reasonableness of lawyers’ efforts ex post when discussion may rise, which is 
difficult and time consuming.
82
 Neither does the contingent fee system require 
the lawyer to use timesheets and maintain an overview of expenses made in 
pursuing the client’s claim, which alleviates the administrative burden. He is 
simply entitled to an agreed portion of the monetary recovery, unless otherwise 
determined in the contingent fee agreement. It is also more convenient for the 
client, now that he faces an easier task to budget his legal expenses.
83
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
75 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation, Philadelphia, American 
Law Institute, 2010, 73. 
76 Ibidem. 
77 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 117. 
78 Ibidem, 120. 
79 Rule 1.8(j) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; ibidem, 117. 
80 Rule 1.2, Comment 5 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
81 Rule 1.16(a)(3) ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
82 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation, Philadelphia, American 
Law Institute, 2010, 73. 
83 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 120. 
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2. BELGIAN CONTEXT 
 
It is particularly intriguing to notice that there is only little debate going on 
about the possible use of contingent fees
84
 in the Belgian context, especially 
because the topic is far more discussed in the Netherlands. In respect of 
methodology, we found it therefore very useful to include some Dutch sources 
as well with regard to contingent fees as the historical and legal context of the 
prohibition in the Netherlands is quite similar to the Belgian one. In the 
following paragraphs we would like to address the origins and boundaries of 
the explicit ban as well as the principles motivating it in order to see whether, 
in a third step, there might be any possibility of implementing a broader notion 
of contingent fees in the Belgian legal practice. Finally, we would like to share 
some reflections on the legal and deontological requirement of independence 
as a general principle of law. 
 
2.1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONFINES OF THE BELGIAN 
PROHIBITION 
 
In respect of the Belgian legal setting regarding lawyer remuneration, the 
Belgian Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter: “Code of Civil Procedure”) 
contains an explicit prohibition on actual contingent fees in the first paragraph 
of Article 446ter.  
 
‘De advocaten begroten hun ereloon met de bescheidenheid die van hun 
functie moet worden verwacht. Een beding daaromtrent dat uitsluitend 
verbonden is aan de uitslag van het geschil, is verboden.’ 
 
Lawyers determine their honorary fee with modesty of the kind expected on 
account of their profession. A contractual provision in that respect, exclusively 
related to the result of the proceedings, is prohibited.
85
 
 
It is important to note that a legislative evolution precedes the second sentence 
of this Article. The current prohibition on the use of contingent fees – often 
addressed with the Latin term pactum de quota litis – can indeed be traced 
back to the period of French domination by Napoleon. On 14 December 1810 
the Imperial Decree contenant réglement sur l’exercise de la profession 
d’avocat et la discipline du Barreau86 was ordained, which included a 
provision in Article 36 prohibiting all contractual arrangements on honorary 
                                                     
84 In respect of the discussion regarding the Belgian context, the term ‘contingent fee’ should in 
principle be construed sensu stricto, i.e. referring to a situation in which the lawyer is purely 
remunerated on a contingent fee basis. It will indeed follow from the analysis that success fees do 
not fall under the Belgian ban, cf. infra.  
85 Free translation. 
86 Free translation: regarding the regulation of the profession of attorney and the discipline of the 
bar. 
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pay concluded before pleadings had come to an end.
87
 The notion 
‘honorarium’88 is in this respect particularly important since the legal 
profession was deemed a nobile officium, a noble service to the community.
89
 
Making arrangements about payment would go against the ideals behind the 
legal profession and reduce it to a vile commercial nature.  
 
It was only until the introduction of the current Code of Civil Procedure in 
1967 that the catch all-prohibition
90
 was mitigated into the more limited ban on 
pacta de quota litis enshrined in Article 459.
91
 Although it was rather generally 
accepted by legal scholars in accordance with preparatory works
92
 that the 
former article did not constitute an impediment for the use of so called success 
fees
93
, legal clarification was thought useful.
94
 Hence, the Amendment Act of 
                                                     
87 Article 36 Décret 14 Décembre 1810 contenant réglement sur l’exercice de la profession 
d’avocat et la discipline du barreau, cf. Pas. 1810-1811, p. 239: ‘leur faisons pareillement défenses 
de faire des traites pour leurs honoraires, ou de forcer les parties à reconnaître leurs soins avant 
les plaidoiries’; Report VAN REEPINGHEN, Hand. Senaat 1963-64, 10 December 1963, nrs. 60, 118 
and 121; M. BIAR and B. VAN DEN DAELE, “Honoraires et indemnisation du préjudice corporel” 
in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de 
Liège, 2005, 56, footnote 1; G. DUCHAINE and E. PICARD, Manuel Pratique de la profession 
d’avocat en Belgique, Brussel, Claassen, 1869, 314-315; E. GUTT and A.-M. STRANART-THILLY, 
“Examen de Jurisprudence (1965 à 1970). Droit judiciaire privé”, RCJB 1973, 148, nr. 42; P. 
HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” in X., 
Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 
2005, 75; P. LAMBERT, Règles et usages de la profession d’avocat du barreau de Bruxelles, 
Brussel, Bruylant, 1994, 543; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque 
tandem…?” in X., Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 460; J. STEVENS, Regels 
en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 39-40, and 531, nr. 727; 
J. STEVENS, “Deontologie: van statica naar dynamica. Over de krachten die ontwikkelingen in de 
advocatendeontologie teweeg brengen”, D&T 2011, iss. 1, 9-10; B. VAN DORPE, “De juridische 
aard van het ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die 
Keure, 2006, 19; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des avocats en Belgique, Brussel, 
Larcier, 1940, 10 and 310, nr. 2162. 
88 The lawyer does not charge a fee for his services; he gets rewarded out of gratitude for his 
representation.  
89 H. LAMON, Een advocaat in de spiegel. Beschouwingen over balie en advocatuur, Brugge, die 
Keure, 2004, 39; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, 
Kluwer, 1997, 520-521, nrs. 712-713; J. STEVENS, “Deontologie: van statica naar dynamica. Over 
de krachten die ontwikkelingen in de advocatendeontologie teweeg brengen”, D&T 2011, iss. 1, 5-
6, nrs.1-2, 8, nrs. 5 and 10-12, nrs. 8-9; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des avocats en 
Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 302, nrs. 2104-2105.  
90 Although the wording does not appear to give any leeway for exceptions, the catch-all 
prohibition was, however, applied less rigorously in practice. Arrangements regarding advance 
payment, for example, were deemed admissible. Cf. inter alia P. LAMBERT, Règles et usages de la 
profession d’avocat du barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, Bruylant, 1994, 543; J. STEVENS, Regels en 
gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 534, nr. 729 ; P. 
VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des avocats en Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 310, nr. 
2163. 
91 E. GUTT and A.-M. STRANART-THILLY, “Examen de Jurisprudence (1965 à 1970). Droit 
judiciaire privé”, RCJB 1973, 149, nr. 42. 
92 Report VAN REEPHINGEN, Hand. Senaat 1963-64, 10 December 1963, nrs. 60 and 121: the new 
provision targets the ‘eigenlijke pact de quota litis’ – ‘pacte de quota litis proprement dit’. 
93 H. LAMON, “Enkel ereloon wanneer de advocaat de zaak wint: geen debat in Vlaanderen?”, Ad 
Rem 2004, iss. 1, 14, nr. 3; H. LAMON, Een advocaat in de spiegel. Beschouwingen over balie en 
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2006
95
 added the adverb ‘exclusively’96 to the prohibition, which thereafter 
was laid down in the current Article 446ter of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The legislative text now stresses the necessary exclusive connection between 
fee and result in order for an agreement regarding honorary payment to fall 
under the prohibition.
97
 It is noteworthy that, in France, that legislative 
clarification process in regard to a similar total ban provision enshrined in 
Article 10 of the law portant réforme de certaines professions judiciares et 
juridiques
98
 had been carried out via an amendment act in 1991
99
 already.
100
 
By virtue of the latter, the possibility of agreeing to success fees was explicitly 
laid down therein. 
 
Traditionally, the prohibition on pacta de quota litis is also linked to Article 
1597 of the Belgian Civil Code (hereafter: “Civil Code”) that for lawyers as 
well as other legal services forbids the taking over of contested rights and 
claims belonging to the competence of the court in which jurisdiction they 
exercise their profession.
101
  
 
                                                                                                                    
advocatuur, Brugge, die Keure, 2004, 101, footnote 265; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de 
quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 
462; F. MOEYKENS, “Hoe begroten van het ereloon van de advocaat, betwistingen, procedures en 
recente rechtspraak” in F. MOEYKENS (ed.), De Praktijkjurist, Gent, Academia, 2001, 55-56; P. 
NEUVILLE, “Pacte de  uota litis – success fee”, Congr s général de la Fédération des Barreaux 
d’Europe   rich – 19 and 20 May 2006, 1; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te 
Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 533, nr. 728.2; B. VAN DORPE, “De juridische aard van het 
ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 
22; contra: B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, 
TPR 1988, iss. 1, 4 (although the author recognizes that the more moderate forms of result-
oriented pay are commonly accepted in practice, see 7, nr.16). 
94 In that respect, HENRY made express reference to the French legislator who, according to his 
opinion, perfectly grasped the evolutions of the time and thus explicitly included the option of 
‘success fees’ as an exception to the prohibition on actual pacta de quota litis. 
95 Article 4 Act of 21 June 2006 tot wijziging van een aantal bepalingen van het Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek met betrekking tot de balie en de tuchtprocedure voor haar leden, Belgian State Gazette 
20 June 2006, 36.166. 
96 Cf. the term ‘uitsluitend’ in the legislative provision. 
97 P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber 
Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 462; P. NEUVILLE, “Pacte de  uota litis – success 
fee”, Congr s général de la Fédération des Barreaux d’Europe   rich – 19 and 20 May 2006, 1 ; J. 
STEVENS and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - Art. 446ter Ger.W” in X., Gerechtelijk recht. 
Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 13, 
footnote 1. 
98 Free translation: relating to the reform on certain judicial professions. 
99 Law nr. 91-647 of 10 July 1991. 
100 Article 10(3) of Law nr. 71-1130 du 31 Décembre 1971 portant réforme de certaines 
professions judiciaires et juridiques. 
101 Court of First Instance Liège, 10 October 2001, JLMB 2002, iss. 3, (120) 121; G. DUCHAINE 
and E. PICARD, Manuel Pratique de la profession d’avocat en Belgique, Brussel, Claassen, 1869, 
314; P. LAMBERT, Règles et usages de la profession d’avocat du barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, 
Bruylant, 1994, 544 (wrongly mentions Article 1797 instead of Article 1597 Civil Code); B. VAN 
DORPE, “De juridische aard van het ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), 
Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 26; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des 
avocats en Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 310, nr. 2165. 
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Pacta de quota litis are sanctioned with absolute invalidity for incompatibility 
with public order
102
. In that event, the contract is indeed deemed to have an 
illicit object for which the annulment penalty applies.
103
 However, once the 
illicit arrangement has been quashed, the lawyer still maintains a claim for 
payment in accordance with the regular standards of professional conduct.
104
  
 
As pointed out in the short historical overview with regard to the evolutions of 
the legislative provision, success fees
105
 did not give rise to any worries before 
the change in wording of 2006. As said, their use was already generally 
accepted in practice and is now, after the clarification measure, clearly 
admitted under the current text.
106
 In contrast to the contingent fee arrangement 
that constitutes the focus of this article, namely the pactum de quota litis, 
success fees only relate to a limited part of the payment for legal 
representation, supplementary to the agreed upon base fee. More in particular, 
a success fee implies that the agreed upon base fee will either be multiplied by 
                                                     
102 Court of First Instance Liège, 10 October 2001, JLMB 2002, iss. 3, (120) 121-122; B. DE 
MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, TPR 1988, iss. 1, 4, 
nr. 6; P. LAMBERT, Règles et usages de la profession d’avocat du barreau de Bruxelles, Brussel, 
Bruylant, 1994, 544; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, 
Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 533, nr. 728.2; J. STEVENS and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - 
Art. 446ter Ger.W” in X., Gerechtelijk recht. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van 
rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Antwerpen, Kluwer, loose-leaf, 13; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de 
l’ordre des avocats en Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, nr. 2171; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du 
pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die 
Keure, 2011, 457-458: though he agrees with the penalty of absolute invalidity, the author, 
however, criticizes the common reference to public order in the literature and jurisprudence as 
motivation behind the interdiction of a pactum de quota litis. According to him, the prohibition in 
Article 446ter Code of Civil Procedure is rather inspired by the concept of public morality because 
of its more changing nature and because of its stronger connection with the principles 
underpinning the legal profession. According to our view, this is a rather subtle academic 
distinction without much practical effect. After all, absolute invalidity stems from Article 6 of the 
Civil Code, including both public order and public morality as grounds for annulment. There is 
thus no difference following the concept used as legal basis to quash the prohibited arrangement. 
103 Article 1133 of the Civil Code. 
104 J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 
533, nr. 728.2; J. STEVENS and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - Art. 446ter Ger.W” in X., 
Gerechtelijk recht. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, 
Antwerpen, Kluwer, loose-leaf, 13; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des avocats en 
Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, nr. 2172. Note that this was also deemed appropriate by some 
judges in the US whenever the contingent fee agreement was considered invalid, cf. supra. 
105 The notion ‘success fee’ is also fre uently addressed with the Latin term pactum de palmario or 
palmarium. 
106 H. DE WULF, “Aandeelhoudersvorderingen met het oog op schadevergoeding - of waarom elke 
aandeelhouder vergoeding van reflexschade kan vorderen, België class actions moet invoeren en 
de minderheidsvordering moet hervormen”, in X., 10 jaar Wetboek Vennootschappen in werking, 
Mechelen, Kluwer, 2011, 507; P. HOFSTRÖSSLER, “Waarom een ‘class action’ in België? 
Krijtlijnen van het voorstel van de Orde van Vlaamse Balies”, Orde van de dag 2011, 102, 
footnote 24; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., 
Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 462; M. PIERS, “Class actions. Verenigde 
Staten v. Europa. Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de Wal-Martzaak”, 
NJW 2007, 835, nr. 28; B. VAN DORPE, “Het ereloon van de advocaat: een speciaal geval”, P&B 
2009, 129, nr. 7.  
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a certain factor, or increased with a percentage of the final outcome or even an 
additional fixed amount.
107
  
 
It is clear that a too restrictive reading of the prohibition on pacta de quota litis 
can lead to abuse. Not every arrangement of a base fee will exclude the 
application of the ban. Therefore, the base fee cannot be merely symbolic, as 
the contract should, then, be dealt with in the same way as pacta de quota 
litis.
108
 Consequently, the base fee needs to be in some reasonable proportion 
to the ‘input’ the lawyer delivered. Whereas LEGROS appears to consider the 
mere recovery of costs sufficient for this purpose
109
, HENRY requires at least 
some reward for the lawyer’s actual work.110 Although there might be some 
evolution in jurisprudence coming up accepting a broader notion of success 
fees leaning towards real pacta de quota litis, thereby interpreting the current 
wording of Article 446ter of the Code of Civil Procedure quite strictly
111
, we 
believe that de lege lata HENRY’s perspective should still prevail. As will 
follow from our discussion in relation to the principles underlying the current 
prohibition in Article 446ter, independence as regards clients constitutes the 
main ratio legis. Taking into account the importance of the principle, the mere 
recovery of costs can, in our view, not render the arrangement compatible with 
Article 446ter. This is even all the more clear with respect to cases in which 
the amount of costs remains fairly low. In that event, it evidently follows that 
the risk element particularly stems from the time input and opportunity costs 
rather than from the actual expenses. Under the present state of the law, it 
                                                     
107 P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” 
in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de 
Liège, 2005, 78; P. NEUVILLE, “Pacte de  uota litis – success fee”, Congr s général de la 
Fédération des Barreaux d’Europe   rich – 19 and 20 May 2006, 2. 
108 Court of First Instance Liège, 10 October 2001, JLMB 2002, iss. 3, 120 as interpreted in P. 
HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” in X., 
Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 
2005, 79-82: though it is not actually clear whether the court construed the old provision of Article 
459 in a strict manner excluding result-oriented pay to a full extent, or in a manner allowing for 
success fees, but not accepting the concrete success fee determined in the case at issue because of 
its disproportionate nature, HENRY is rather convinced that the court was of the latter opinion. In 
his view, the court did, in fact, accept the principle of success fees, yet not the concrete application 
in the case. “C’est donc la démesure qui a été condamnée, et non le principe.” ; in the same sense: 
B. VAN DORPE, “De juridische aard van het ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), 
Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 26; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota 
litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 462: 
“Depuis le 21 juin 2006, le pacte non “exclusivement” lié au résultat de la contestation est donc 
autorisé, c’est-à-dire, le pacte qui n’est pas “uniquement” ou “essentiellement” fondé sur le 
résultat de la contestation mais qui prend en compte d’autres paramètres.” (own underlining). 
109 P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber 
Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 464-466: he notices, as it were, a shift to a 
reasonable acknowledgement of the pactum de quota litis (“une reconnaisance ‘raisonnable’”). 
110 P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” 
in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de 
Liège, 2005, 79. 
111 Court of Appeal Ghent, 28 February 2008, P&B 2009, iss. 4, 138. 
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should, however, in our opinion, not form a problem for the agreed upon 
success fee to constitute a larger amount than the actual base fee.
112
  
 
It already follows from the admissibility of success fees that the outcome of a 
case – let it be loss or success – certainly plays a role in the determination of a 
lawyer’s honorarium. Even if no contractual arrangement is made beforehand, 
it is certainly one of the factors that can lawfully be taken into account when 
calculating the fee. Other factors comprise inter alia the client’s financial 
position, the lawyer’s talent and efforts, and the stakes of the case.113 Of 
course, the determination of the fee is ultimately subject to review by the Bar 
and the judiciary
114
 that will see to enforce the modesty requirement included 
in the first sentence of Article 446ter of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
 
2.2. UNDERPINNINGS OF THE LEGAL BAN 
 
In order to incite the academic debate in relation to the admissibility of 
contingent fees within the Belgian setting, it is necessary to reveal the 
principles underpinning the current explicit ban. Professional independence of 
a lawyer vis-à-vis his client appears to be the overarching principle. In this 
section we will limit ourselves to the discussion of those underpinnings as 
such. In the next section we will then provide for nuanced perspectives on 
those motivations for the Belgian ban. 
 
In the Imperial Decree of 1810, the importance of a lawyer’s professional 
independence was already highlighted in its preamble
115
 and further developed 
in Article 37. That provision required from lawyers to exercise their profession 
at liberty with a view to justice and truth and, in addition, to abstain from using 
                                                     
112 HENRY touched upon this aspect of monetary difference by referring to cases of the French 
‘Court de Cassation’ in P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de 
l’honoraire de résultat)” in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions 
du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 2005, 80. 
113 J. BIGWOOD, “La détermination des honoraires de l’avocat”, JT 1999, 459, nr. 2.4; J. STEVENS 
and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - Art. 446ter Ger.W” in X., Gerechtelijk recht. 
Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 
loose-leaf, 8-10, nr. 5. 
114 Art. 446ter, paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Vrederechter Sint-Jans-Molenbeek 14 
March 1989, JT 1989, 384; J. STEVENS and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - Art. 446ter 
Ger.W” in X., Gerechtelijk recht. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en 
rechtsleer, Antwerpen, Kluwer, loose-leaf,10-12, nrs. 6-7; B. VAN DORPE, “Het ereloon van de 
advocaat: een speciaal geval”, P&B 2009, 129-130, nrs. 8 and 9. 
115 “Lorsque nous nous occupions de l’organisation de l’ordre judiciaire, et des moyens d’assurer 
à nos cours la haute considération qui leur est due, une profession dont l’exercice influe 
puissamment sur la distribution de la justice a fixé nos regards; nous avons en conséquence 
ordonné, par la loi du 22 ventôse an 12, le rétablissement du tableau des avocats, comme un des 
moyens les plus propres à maintenir la probité, la délicatesse, le désintéressement, le désir de la 
conciliation, l’amour de la vérité et de la justice, un zèle éclairé pour les faibles et les opprimés, 
bases essentielles de leur état.” 
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illicit or vexatious means.
116
 The image of the lawyer as auxiliaire de la 
justice
117
 is here evoked, meaning that a lawyer should not act as a parasite of 
the system using any loophole possible to lodge any case possible. Instead, he 
should contribute to the preservation of the legal system throughout his pursuit 
for truth.
 
He should thus only accept cases that he believes to be just.
118 
In 
preparing and conducting proceedings, he should only take recourse to proper 
means justified in view of the legal context in which the issue is embedded.
119
 
Until today, that idea of a necessary honourable attitude remains enshrined in 
Article 444 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, it is part of the oath 
undertaken and sworn by any beginning lawyer in Belgium.
120
 
 
Inspired by the omnipresence of the independence principle in the Belgian 
system, the risk of an over-identification with clients’ interests ensuing from 
result-oriented pay is the primary concern for critics of contingent fee 
practices.
121
 In their view, a lawyer would be too caught up by what is at stake, 
since losing the case will not render him any benefit at all while a possible 
generous fee awaits him in the event of triumph. Fear stems from the 
                                                     
116 “Les avocats exerceront librement leur ministère pour la défense de la justice et de la vérité; 
nous voulons en même temps qu’ils s’abstiennent de toute supposition dans les faits, de toute 
surprise dans les citations, et autres mauvaises voies, même de tous discours inutiles et superflus.” 
117 E. DEGROOTE, “Professionele onafhankelijkheid in de advocatuur”, Ad Rem 2004, iss. 1, 18, nr. 
10; P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” 
in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de 
Liège, 2005, 75; P. NEUVILLE, “Pacte de  uota litis – success fee”, Congr s général de la 
Fédération des Barreaux d’Europe   rich – 19 and 20 May 2006, 1. 
118 G. DUCHAINE and E. PICARD, Manuel Pratique de la profession d’avocat en Belgique, Brussel, 
Claassen, 1869, 292; H. LAMON, Een advocaat in de spiegel. Beschouwingen over balie en 
advocatuur, Brugge, die Keure, 2004, 39, nrs. 32, 35 and 41-42; J. STEVENS, “Deontologie: van 
statica naar dynamica. Over de krachten die ontwikkelingen in de advocatendeontologie teweeg 
brengen”, D&T 2011, iss. 1, 10, nr. 8; M.-E. STORME, “Déontologie professionnelle et conduite 
loyale du proc s” in X., Rôle et organisation de magistrats et avocats dans les sociétés 
contemporaines, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1992, 21, nr. 13; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de 
l’ordre des avocats en Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 283, nr. 1963. 
119 G. DUCHAINE and E. PICARD, Manuel Pratique de la profession d’avocat en Belgique, Brussel, 
Claassen, 1869, 288; H. LAMON, Een advocaat in de spiegel. Beschouwingen over balie en 
advocatuur, Brugge, die Keure, 2004, 43, nr. 36; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des 
avocats en Belgique, Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 284, nr. 1966. 
120 Article 429 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
121 M. BIAR and B. VAN DEN DAELE, “Honoraires et indemnisation du préjudice corporel” in X., 
Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 
2005, 56-57; B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, 
TPR 1988, iss. 1, 10; P. LAMBERT, Règles et usages de la profession d’avocat du barreau de 
Bruxelles, Brussel, Bruylant, 1994, 544; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te 
Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 22; J. STEVENS and I. VANDEVELDE, “Art. 439 Ger.W. - 
Art. 446ter Ger.W” in X., Gerechtelijk recht. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van 
rechtspraak en rechtsleer, Antwerpen, Kluwer, loose-leaf, 13; M.-E. STORME, “Déontologie 
professionnelle et conduite loyale du proc s” in X., Rôle et organisation de magistrats et avocats 
dans les sociétés contemporaines, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1992, 23, nr. 16; B. VAN DORPE, “De 
juridische aard van het ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), Advocatenerelonen, 
Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 26; P. VERMEYLEN, Règles et usages de l’ordre des avocats en Belgique, 
Brussel, Larcier, 1940, 310, nr. 2164.   
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consequent conceivable lack of adequate judgment in respect of the merits of 
the case.
122
 Therefore, a lawyer’s assessment is said to be disturbed by the 
expectation of future gain, not only in relation to the acceptance of the case, 
but also with regard to the means employed during the course of action. 
Contingent fees would instigate a lawyer to resort to trickery and deceit, hence 
causing him to depart from the solemn oath he once undertook.
123
 In 
conclusion, contingent fees would harm the honour and dignity of the legal 
profession.  
 
For the sake of completeness, reference can also be made to the Code of 
Conduct for European Lawyers (hereafter: “Code of Conduct”) of the Council 
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (hereafter: “CCBE”). Independence 
clearly stands among the core values of the legal profession in the European 
Union.  
 
“Advice given by a lawyer to the client has no value if the lawyer gives it only 
to ingratiate him- or herself, to serve his or her personal interests or in 
response to outside pressure.”124 
 
In that respect, pacta de quota litis are explicit forbidden practice as follows 
from Article 3.3.1. CCBE Code. It should, however, be noted that the CCBE 
Code of Conduct only constitutes a binding text with regard to cross-border 
activities within the European Union and European Economic Area.
125
 
Nonetheless, even for purely internal matters, it remains an important 
reference guide, as it indicates fairly common principles of legal practice in the 
European context.
126
  
 
Some other related concerns come to mind as well as regards the possible 
implementation of contingent fees. Result-oriented pay may for example 
trigger a lawyer to make abuse of the vulnerable position an injured client 
finds himself in.
127
 A client’s vision might be clouded due to the damage he 
has undergone leading to feelings of anger and vengeance encouraging a 
litigation spirit at the expense of reasonableness. Where a lawyer is normally 
                                                     
122 G. DUCHAINE and E. PICARD, Manuel Pratique de la profession d’avocat en Belgique, Brussel, 
Claassen, 1869, 315; H. SMEYERS, “De juridische dienstverlening en juridische beroepen 
reguleren”, Ad Rem 2008, iss. 4, 26. 
123 H. LAMON, Een advocaat in de spiegel. Beschouwingen over balie en advocatuur, Brugge, die 
Keure, 2004, 43. 
124 Article 2.1.2. CCBE Code of Conduct, 
www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/EN_Code_of_conductp1_1306748215.pdf, 
last accessed on 05.03.2013 (last version of 2006). 
125 Article 1.5 CCBE Code of Conduct. 
126 Article 1.3.2 CCBE Code of Conduct. For a more general discussion of the CCBE Code of 
Conduct, see J. STEVENS, “De Europese advocaten: een deontologie?”, Ad Rem 2006, 24-33. 
127 P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” 
in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de 
Liège, 2005, 75. 
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expected to advise in a moderate fashion, his voice will now resolutely speak 
in favour of launching proceedings instead of weighing and considering 
options. Similarly, he might also be triggered to not give up, to continue 
proceedings out of a mere hope for success though actually futile, merely 
because his own interest is at stake and because he may have already invested 
a lot of money and effort into it.
128
 According to many, the increase in 
frivolous lawsuits and nuisance claims is in this manner likely to bring about a 
litigation society, which from a social efficiency perspective is highly 
undesirable.
129
  
 
It is key to see that litigation is, however, not always the most favourable 
option for the contingent fee lawyer as he is in fact playing a zero-sum game. 
He might eventually choose for a more modest but secure profit in the form of 
a settlement. Benefits of this practice are quite obvious. Early settlement will 
evidently make the lawyer avoid costs of long-lasting proceedings. In addition, 
risk of losing will be fully reduced. In contrast, the client is not exposed to the 
costs and time-consuming nature of the proceedings in a contingency fee 
system. A client will therefore not consider litigation costs in deciding over 
settlement, but he will of course be inclined to follow the misbelieved honest 
advice of his lawyer for whom the costs do make a difference. Rather than a 
genuine alternative to litigation for the client
130
, settlement can thus become a 
misleading strategy in view of immediate gain for the lawyer.
131
  
Another abuse of a client’s weak position might occur as to the arrangement of 
the actual fee. As the average client is not acquainted with the rules of the legal 
game, he is not in the position to properly assess the strengths and weaknesses 
of his own case. Consequently, a lawyer might falsely postulate that there is 
only a slight chance of winning, resulting in the arrangement of a 
proportionately higher percentage of the final outcome to compensate for the 
alleged riskiness of the undertaking. Indeed, if the outcome was almost certain, 
contrary to the lawyer’s statements, the client will be the victim of cunning 
                                                     
128 Article 446ter (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
129 B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, TPR 1988, 
iss. 1, 9, nr. 22; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, 
Kluwer, 1997, 534, nr. 728.3. 
130 Which should be the aim as also described in Article 3.7.1. CCBE Code of Conduct: “The 
lawyer should at all times strive to achieve the most cost-effective resolution of the client’s dispute 
and should advise the client at appropriate stages as to the desirability of attempting a settlement 
and/or a reference to alternative dispute resolution.” 
131 B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, TPR 1988, 
iss. 1, 8, nr. 20; H. DE WULF, “Aandeelhoudersvorderingen met het oog op schadevergoeding - of 
waarom elke aandeelhouder vergoeding van reflexschade kan vorderen, België class actions moet 
invoeren en de minderheidsvordering moet hervormen”, in X., 10 jaar Wetboek Vennootschappen 
in werking, Mechelen, Kluwer, 2011, 506; M. PIERS, “Class actions. Verenigde Staten v. Europa. 
Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de Wal-Martzaak”, NJW 2007, 831, nr. 
22. 
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deception. The lawyer will thence receive an unjust fee in excess proportion to 
the risks and efforts of lodging the claim.
132
  
 
 
2.3. CONTINGENT FEES REVISITED 
 
It follows from the above discussion on the history and underpinnings of 
current article 446ter of the Code of Civil Procedure that the ban on pacta de 
quota litis is quite firmly embedded in the Belgian legal setting. Nevertheless, 
it is our endeavour to question whether this prohibition should effectively be 
maintained in present day context. Evolutions in the sphere of competition law 
with regard to price setting may incite this discussion on sustainability even 
further
133
, yet that is not the aim of the article. Our approach here is more 
directed towards the underlying principles of the prohibition, the inherent 
merits and flaws. We already addressed the main merits of enhancing access to 
courts
134
 and inspiring the lawyer to a qualitatively good and efficient handling 
of the case
135
 in the section on the American implementation. In this section, 
we would now like to nuance the flaws so commonly addressed by contingent 
fee critics. In performing that nuancing exercise, we will bear in mind the valid 
stance of CHASE that transporting disputing procedures from one society to 
                                                     
132 Especially in relation to class actions: M. PIERS, “Class actions. Verenigde Staten v. Europa. 
Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de Wal-Martzaak”, NJW 2007, 831, nr. 
22; M. PIERS and E. DE BAERE, “Collectief slachtofferschap in rechtsvergelijkend perspectief”, 
Orde van de dag 2011, iss. 54, 20; HENRY mentions the term “retirement cases” to stress the 
possible lucrativeness of working with contingent fees in P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre 
l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” in X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le 
devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 2005, 75. 
133 Useful insights from a competition law perspective can be found in H. LAMON, “Enkel ereloon 
wanneer de advocaat de zaak wint: geen debat in Vlaanderen?”, Ad Rem 2004, iss. 1, 14-15, nr. 3; 
S. TACK, “Relatie advocaat-cliënt”, NJW 2005, iss. 118, 846-850, nrs. 100-119; A.-M. VAN DEN 
BOSSCHE, “Ereloonafspraken: heerlijk, helder, geheid verboden?” in J. STEVENS (ed.), 
Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 250-279, nrs. 63-86; Particularly in the Netherlands, 
the legitimacy of the prohibition on pacta de quota seen through a competition law lens has 
received plenty attention after the national competition authority sanctioned the deontological rule 
as an unlawful price arrangement, e.g. M.B.W. BIESHEUVEL, “No cure no pay en  uota pars litis in 
discussie”, NJB 1999, iss. 7, 295-296; J.C.A. HOUDIJK, “Vrije beroepen, deontologie en het 
mededingingsrecht – hoeveel ruimte blijft er over voor beroepsregulering in advocatuur en 
notariaat?”, RM Themis 2005, iss. 5, 260-261; F. TEN HAVE and J. MULDER, “Het Nederlandse 
verbod op no cure no pay en quota pars litis: een mededingingsrechtelijk perspectief, AA(Ned.) 
2007, iss. 5, 438-447. 
134 B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, TPR 1988, 
iss. 1, 7-8, nrs. 17-18; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” 
in X., Liber Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 457-464; M. PIERS, “Class actions. 
Verenigde Staten v. Europa. Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de Wal-
Martzaak”, NJW 2007, 831, nr. 22; O. SLUSNY, “L’Acc s à la justice pour les justiciables 
défavorisés”, Journal des Proces 28 December 2001, iss. 427, 9; J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken 
van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 534, 728.3. 
135 B. VAN DORPE, “De juridische aard van het ereloon naar Belgisch recht” in J. STEVENS (ed.), 
Advocatenerelonen, Brugge, die Keure, 2006, 26. 
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another however entails inherent problems
136
 and that therefore a legal 
transplant does not always constitute a perfect fit. 
 
As mentioned above, one of the most common critiques is that the use of 
contingent fee contracts can cause a flood of litigation
137
 and the stirring up of 
groundless and dubious claims
138
. The possibility of winning big, e.g. by 
earning windfalls, may indeed lead lawyers to engaging in techniques to funnel 
business their way and some of the methods utilized balance on the ethical 
borderline.
139
 This is particularly true in personal injury litigation.
140
 However, 
when a lawyer works on a contingent fee basis, he only receives compensation 
for his services when there is monetary recovery. As a result, he might actually 
be more likely to function as a first judge and turn away cases that are not 
likely to yield him any profit, unless he agrees on taking up the case for a high 
contingent fee or on an hourly basis.
141
 Furthermore, a higher number of cases 
is not necessarily a bad thing, considering that access to the courts is important 
and a fundamental right.
142
 One should only view a higher number of cases as 
a problem, when social repose is preferred over litigiousness.
143
 Empirical 
research
144
 has actually also pointed out that contingency fee lawyers do not 
benefit so much more financially than lawyers that charge their clients on an 
hourly basis and that they do turn away plenty of cases, so the suggestion that 
lawyers take frivolous lawsuits in the hope of winning big may be 
unfounded
145
. It should be noted as well that a client might also risk to be 
                                                     
136 O. CHASE, “Legal processes and national culture”, Cardozo J.Int’l & Comp.L. 1 (1997), 18. Cf. 
the references to literature in footnote 100 of CHASE’s article. 
137 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1998, (261) 264. 
138 D. MELLINKOFF, Lawyers and the System of Justice: Cases and Notes on the Profession of the 
Law, Saint-Paul, West Publishing Co., 1976, 296. 
139 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the 
United States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 160. 
140 In the US, personal injury lawyers are therefore often called ‘ambulance chasers’.  
141 J. DE MOT, “Burgerlijk procesrecht en empirisch onderzoek”, NJW 2005, iss. 108, 474, nr. 12; 
P. HENRY, “Erin Brockovich contre l’ordre de Cicéron (de la licéité de l’honoraire de résultat)” in 
X., Déontologie. Les honoraires. Le devoir de conseil, Luik, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 
2005; P. LEGROS, “L’interdiction du pacte “de quota litis”. Quousque tandem…?” in X., Liber 
Amicorum Jo Stevens, Brugge, die Keure, 2011, 464; M. PIERS, “Class actions. Verenigde Staten 
v. Europa. Rechtsvergelijkende beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de Wal-Martzaak”, NJW 
2007, 831, nr. 22; O. SLUSNY, “L’Acc s à la justice pour les justiciables défavorisés”, Journal des 
Proces 28 December 2001, iss. 427, 9. 
142 H. DE WULF, “Aandeelhoudersvorderingen met het oog op schadevergoeding - of waarom elke 
aandeelhouder vergoeding van reflexschade kan vorderen, België class actions moet invoeren en 
de minderheidsvordering moet hervormen”, in X., 10 jaar Wetboek Vennootschappen in werking, 
Mechelen, Kluwer, 2011, 508. 
143 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1998, (261) 264. 
144 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, 267. 
145 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the 
United States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 160. 
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confronted with a counterclaim for vexatious and reckless proceedings in the 
event the case clearly is without any merits.
146
  
 
We discussed the risk of inducement towards early settlements in view of 
immediate gain. That danger is indeed present, yet a similar risk of deceptive 
practices is attached to the use of hourly fees. Attorneys billing by the hour are 
indeed incentivized to stretch out proceedings, to use every possible procedural 
tool to prolong litigation as to reach out to the bottom of every case, even 
though no favourable outcome can be found there. The longer the lawyer is 
instructed onto the case, the more he earns.
147
 In the present day Belgian 
context, we believe this risk can be sufficiently curtailed to reasonable 
proportions both by virtue of the lawyer’s stimulus to uphold reputation and 
the enforcement of disciplinary rules. The same risk prevention can be 
expected to ensue from those two factors in relation to an eventual admission 
of pacta de quota litis. Most probably, a lawyer will not seek to jeopardize his 
sincere status in the eyes of his clients, because it might have an impact on 
future solicitations. In the event a lawyer’s sincerity would not weigh up 
against the greed provoked by his commercial instinct, causing him to mislead, 
a client can always raise a claim for violation of the disciplinary rules. An 
effective deterrent result can, however, only be attained on the condition that 
clients are properly informed of this possibility and enforcement is adequate.  
 
Another critique is that the system can lead to the lawyer receiving an 
unconscionable large fee.
148
 In the United States, this has led to the increase of 
verdicts taken by juries in medical malpractice, because they felt that the client 
did not receive sufficient compensation as a result of the contingency fee 
agreement.
149
 However, a fee that looks large in retrospect may not appear as 
large if one takes into consideration that the fee was contingent and that the 
lawyer thus risked receiving nothing.
150
 As mentioned above, the empirical 
research by KRITZER also points out that the average effective hourly rate is 
not significantly higher than when the attorney is being paid on an hourly or 
                                                     
146 H. DE WULF, “Aandeelhoudersvorderingen met het oog op schadevergoeding - of waarom elke 
aandeelhouder vergoeding van reflexschade kan vorderen, België class actions moet invoeren en 
de minderheidsvordering moet hervormen”, in X., 10 jaar Wetboek Vennootschappen in werking, 
Mechelen, Kluwer, 2011, 507. 
147 Ibidem; B. DE MEULENAERE, “Advocatenhonoraria, een consumentvriendelijk perspectief”, 
TPR 1988, iss. 1, 9, nr. 21. 
148 S. LANDSMAN, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History”, 
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1998, (261) 264. 
149 D. MELLINKOFF, Lawyers and the System of Justice: Cases and Notes on the Profession of the 
Law, Saint-Paul, West Publishing Co., 1976, 296. 
150 R.D. ROTUNDA, Legal Ethics. The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, 
West Group, 2002-2003, 109. As regards class actions for example, a big win may follow at the 
end of the procedure, yet a priori, such profit is never certain. That is why it occurs that contingent 
fee lawyers lend with the bank in order to finance the procedure and accordingly will be exposed 
to severe risks upon failure.  
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flat fee, they are in the same ballpark.
151
 Very large effective hourly rates are 
indeed possible and can be a windfall, far out of proportion to the actual time 
invested or skills utilized
152
, but they are certainly not typical
153
. Furthermore, 
we should also keep in mind that the lawyer provides additional services
154
, so 
a larger fee could be justified to a certain extent. In a certain sense, a higher 
effective hourly rate could be seen as a premium for eased access to the civil 
justice system.
155
 Besides that, the risk of getting no fee at all has to be taken 
into account as well: the cases in which the lawyer does receive a fee have to 
offset the free service he has provided in unsuccessful cases. Some lawyers in 
the US have a mixed strategy and take up contingent fee cases and hourly fee 
work, to make sure ‘the lights keep burning’.156 It is also not that uncommon 
for US lawyers to collect a fee that is less than what he or she is actually 
entitled to under the agreement, because it could facilitate a settlement outside 
court if the attorney agrees to a smaller portion of the settlement, or to generate 
goodwill.
157
 
 
More focused onto the Belgian context, the so-called American circumstances 
of litigation flood, settlement seeking, and over-remuneration are actually not 
very likely to occur. After all, what typifies the American setting is that 
expectancies of gain are incited by the astronomical amounts of damages 
possibly - but actually very often - awarded to plaintiffs.
158
 In that respect the 
existence of punitive in addition to compensatory damages has an enormous 
impact in civil cases, yet Belgium as most other European countries does not 
know that form of penalty. Moreover, Belgium does not have a jury system in 
civil matters, as a result of which compensation is more carefully awarded than 
in the US. Hence, it follows that in the Belgian setting comparatively more 
weight shall accrue to the expected chance of winning, strongly inducing the 
lawyer to accept a case only in the event of a reasonable prospect of success. 
The slight likelihood of unreasonably high recovery also tempers the 
acceptance of cases merely to force opposing party to settlement. This is even 
more so the case since Belgium, in contrast to the US
159
, has adopted the loser 
pays-rule as a result of which the winning party does not have to bear (all) the 
procedural costs of going into litigation. Consequently, opposing party will not 
                                                     
151 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 273. 
152 D.W. NEUBAUER and S.S. MEINHOLD, Judicial Process. Law, Courts, and Politics in the 
United States, Belmont, Thompson-Wadsworth, 2007, 160. 
153 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 273. 
154 I.e. a financing service and an insurance service (although there is no premium here), cf. supra. 
155 H.M. KRITZER, “The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice”, DePaul 
L.Rev. 1998, (267) 307. 
156 Ibidem, 304. 
157 Ibidem, 289. 
158 J. STEVENS, Regels en gebruiken van de advocatuur te Antwerpen, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1997, 
534, nr. 728.3. 
159 In the US each party bears his own costs, which is often called the “each man for himself” rule.  
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so easily be inclined to conclude to settlement out of fear for disproportionate 
damages and high costs. It should also be noted that procedural costs do not 
amount to the same levels as in the United States so that, even in the event of 
losing, opposing party only risks to pay relatively little costs in comparison to 
the losing party in the US. That will also make him less eager to agree to 
settlement.  
 
Another element that needs to be taken into account is the Belgian system of 
legal aid, which does not have its equivalent in the US. As the Belgian client 
thus has another system in the form of legal aid to fall back on to lodge his 
claim, he will probably consider more diligently the pros and cons of 
instructing a contingent fee lawyer. A contingent fee system should thus be 
understood more in the sense of adding a possibility for the economically 
deprived in Belgium. More in particular, it could also provide the welcome 
opportunity for those types of clients to instruct a more experienced or 
qualified lawyer whose expertise normally goes far beyond their financial state 
can afford.
160
 
 
It is clear that most concerns as regard the use of contingent fees stem from the 
very nature of the relationship between client and lawyer. A lawyer is 
instructed to act as agent according to the best possible strategy in furtherance 
to his client’s interests, yet a typical client does not have the necessary skills to 
assess the lawyer’s advice. A principal-agent problem therefore characterizes 
the lawyer-client relationship. The practice of contingent fees is in that respect 
said to provide for disincentives to the lawyer since he will be more inclined to 
bring his own interests into the picture and consequently become too much of a 
party concerned or even mislead the client. Whereas result-oriented pay is 
encouraged in the business atmosphere to actually tackle the principal-agent 
problem between shareholders and managers
161
, in the Belgian setting of 
lawyer remuneration the possible positive benefits of quality and efficiency 
ensuing from this alignment of interests
162
 are overshadowed and outweighed 
by the negative perspectives on the matter. A contingent fee practice remains 
seen as an element that would corrupt the lawyer’s advising voice and disturb 
his vision on the matter. Independence as a principle, therefore, is the alleged 
main hurdle to overcome in view of a possible Belgian approval of pacta de 
quota litis.  
 
In that respect, we would like to address the more fundamental question 
whether a lawyer’s professional independence is still to be regarded as a 
bedrock principle firmly anchored in the Belgian legal system? Does this 
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underpinning prevail to the same extent as in the past or have matters evolved? 
The picture of a lawyer as loyal servant and protector of the judicial system 
has effectively undergone some changes over time. More and more, it is 
recognized that a lawyer should not be regarded as the auxiliaire de la justice 
once so nobly portrayed.
163
 All those tendencies denote a shift in thinking 
about how independence should nowadays still govern the conduct of a 
lawyer. In our opinion, a lawyer, in essence, is just another commercial player 
providing services for which there exists a demand on the market. Taking that 
perspective, we do not underestimate the role a lawyer can play as first judge, 
yet we do not fear to acknowledge that this scrutiny is de facto inspired by an 
economic rationale of reputational and quality concerns rather than a moral 
obligation following an oath once sworn. If a lawyer seeks to become or 
maintain an interesting commercial party, he will naturally need to live up to 
those quality standards. And, as already stated, in the event a lawyer would 
nevertheless be triggered to act wrongly, the disciplinary authorities can still 
sanction him for his conduct. 
  
Why is this shift in thinking about independence important? When considering 
the possible admissibility of contingency fees, one should pay attention to 
whether society can be deemed susceptible for such a change.
164
 As a 
legislative change in favour of pacta de quota litis ultimately needs to be 
implemented by the legal profession and judiciary, it is advisable to examine 
whether the judicial society is indeed ready for such a revolution. Although the 
effect of general principles of law, in principle
165
, can be altered by a 
legislative text, it is by no means desirable that a legislative admission of pacta 
de quota litis would, for example, remain idle by a too rigid judicial 
interpretation of the modesty requirement in 446ter Code of Civil Procedure. 
The importance of this societal acceptability was already recognized during the 
preparations of the current Code of Civil procedure. Commentator DE BAECK 
then stated: “It did not escape from your commissions’ attention that the 
further success of the wonderful construction the Code of Civil Procedure is 
will heavily depend on the good intentions of those who need to implement it 
and on their human conditions.”166  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The contingent fee system has its merits and flaws, but if proper methods can 
be developed that help to discourage lawyer overreaching, both with regard to 
remuneration and control, this system preserves a great opportunity to enable 
access to the courts for everyone
167
. We believe the contingent fee system can 
be of considerable value to the economically deprived that nevertheless cannot 
benefit from free legal aid because they are not poor enough and fall in 
between. Hence, we do not see the contingent fee as a substitute for free legal 
services, but as an additional measure to guarantee access to the courts to all 
citizens. In that respect, the widely accepted practice of the contingent fee in 
the United States can be regarded as the implicit admission of the legal 
profession’s failure there to guarantee universal access to the courts without 
such result-oriented remuneration method
168
. In our view as well, such wide 
accessibility should indeed be an imperative of a modern welfare state. It is 
therefore our hope a possible implementation of contingent fees would at least 
receive more attention and form subject of a more lively debate.   
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